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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
The jurisdiction of all appellate courts "shall be provided by statute."1 Section 78-22(3)(j) of the Utah Code, provides that: 'The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction ...,
over orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals
does not have original appellate jurisdiction[.]"2 This is an appeal from the final judgment
of the Third District Court in a civil matter, and although it has original appellate jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court has transferred this matter to the Court of Appeals pursuant to § 78-2-2(4)
and § 78-2a-3(2)(j), which provide that the Supreme Court may transfer any matter over
which it has original appellate jurisdiction.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether Appellant, pursuant to the Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually

Explicit Email Act, Utah Code §§ 13-36-101 to 13-36-105 (2002), can be found to have a
preexisting relationship, which subjects him to commercial emails, when Appellant has
affirmatively requested removal from that email list.
2.

Whether Appellant can be found to have a preexisting relationship with a

business with whom Appellant has never done business because the SPAMMER purchased
a mailing list from another person with whom the Appellant had done business?

1

Utah Const., Article VIII, § 5.

2

Ut. Code Ann., § 78-2-2(3)0) (1953, as amended).
1

3.

What is the meaning of "preexisting relationship" as used in the Utah Act?

4.

Whether the lower court erred by granting summary judgment without

permitting any discovery to be conducted by the parties and while Appellant was seeking
discovery under Ut.R.Civ.P. 56(f)?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court should review the legal conclusions of the trial court (since this was a
summary judgment it was resolved in toto upon legal conclusions) for correctness.
"Generally, we review a trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, according the trial
court no particular deference." Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, P 11,
54 P.3d 1177, 1181 (quoting Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998)).
This Court should review the statutory interpretations of the Third District Court for
correctness. "We review the district court's statutory interpretations for correctness." Davis
County Solid Waste Mgmt. v. City of Bountiful 2002 UT 60, P 9, 52 P.3d 1174. "We look
first to the statute's plain language as evidence of the legislature's intent, and give effect to
that plain language unless the statute is ambiguous." Id. at P 10. "We analyze the language
of a statutory provision in light of other provisions within the same statute or act, and we
attempt to harmonize the provisions in accordance with the legislative intent so as to give
meaning to each provision." Id.

2

APPLICABLE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO APPEAL
Ut.R.Civ.P. 56(e) and Ut.R.Civ.P 56(f). These are set out in full in the accompanying
Appendix to this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:
This case involves the sending of an unsolicited commercial email by Sprint
Communications,

Inc.

(Defendant/Appellee/Sprint)

to

Terry

Gillman

(Plaintiff/Appellant/Gillman) for which Gillman brought this action in accordance with the
Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually Explicit Email Act found in Utah Code Annotated §§
13-36-101 to 13-36-105 (2002) (the "Statute"). This is a case of first impression.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below:
Gillman filed this action in the Third District Court, Sandy Division on June 18,2002
alleging that Sprint sent or caused to be sent to Gillman an unsolicited commercial email in
violation of the Statute. See Court Record (Ct. Rec.) p. 1-12. On September 17,2002, only
19 days after the parties entered a Stipulated Discovery Schedule and Case Management
Order (Ct. Rec. p. 85-91), Sprint filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, with supporting
memoranda. (Ct. Rec. p. 103-59). On September 26, 2002, Gillman filed a motion and
memorandum for Relief Under Rule 56(f) (Ct. Rec. p. 194-99) and an Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Ct. Rec. p. 210-47).

3

Pursuant to the direction of Judge Denise P. Lindberg, Sprint filed a revised
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, November 1,2002
(Ct. Rec. pp. 288-338), and Plaintiff filed a revised Opposition November 8, 2002 (Ct. Rec.
pp. 339-385). The matter came on for hearing before Judge Lindberg on December 10,2002.
(Ct. Rec. p. 507). On February 28, 2003, Judge Lindberg filed her Memorandum Decision
and Order on Defendant Sprint's Motion for Summary Judgment, in which she granted
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The lower court found that there was a
preexisting commercial relationship between Gillman and GroupLotto, and therefore the
email sent by Sprint did not fit within the statutory definition of "unsolicited commercial
email" (Ct. Rec. pp.505-13) and judgment was accordingly entered April 9, 2003 (Ct. Rec.
pp. 522-24).
Gillman filed his Notice of Appeal April 11,2003 (Ct. Rec. pp. 525-28) with the Utah
Supreme Court which subsequently transferred this matter to this Court on July 18,2003 (Ct.
Rec. p. 546).

Facts established in the Record below:

4

1.

April 14,2002, Gillman signed up for Audiogalaxy3, an on-line music service,

which also allegedly registered him to receive offers and promotions from GroupLotto,
another entity. Ct. Rec. p. 313, Affidavit of Kate Vein, Exhibit A of Defendant's Revised
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, f 3.
2.

Sprint states in the Affidavit of Kate Vein, used as support for it's

Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment that Audiogalaxy is also affiliated with an
entity named MAXWORLDWIDE. Ct. Rec. p. 313, Affidavit of Kate Vein, Exhibit A of
Defendant's Revised Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, f 2.
3.

Sprint states in the Affidavit of Jared Brody, used as support for it's

Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment that Traffix is a database marketing and
management company4 that owns GroupLotto. Ct. Rec. p. 315, Affidavit of Jared Brody,
Exhibit B of Defendant's Revised Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, <H 2,3.
4.

Sprint states in the Affidavit of Kate Vein, used as support for it's

Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment that MAXWORLDWIDE has an agreement
3

Mr. Gillman visited Audiogalaxy to download music, not to obtain email
solicitations. The "registration" was, according to Sprint, effective to give consent, and
thereby a business relationship, for the affiliated GroupLotto and a host of others,
including Sprint, to be able to SPAM Gillman. It is that attenuated claim of consent
which the lower court accepted as a defense to Gillman's claims under Utah's Anti-Spam
Act.
4

Meaning that it sells names for SPAM. This is a typical arrangement in the world
of SPAMMERS, whose lifeblood is the email addresses of active accounts, such as Mr.
Gillman's in this case.
5

with Traffix, whereby Traffix pays MAXWORLDWIDE to provide Traffix the email
addresses of Audiogalaxy users. Ct. Rec. p. 313, Affidavit of Kate Vein, Exhibit A of
Defendant's Revised Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, f 2.
5.

Sprint states in the Affidavit of Jared Brody, used as support for it's

Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment that L90 is a separate, independent company
that, among other things, transacts business with an online site known as Audiogalaxy.
Under an agreement between Traffix and L90, people who sign up for Audiogalaxy can
concurrently agree to receive via email information and offers from GroupLotto. Traffix
pays L90 (who in turn pays Audiogalaxy) to provide the email address of those Audiogalaxy
users who agree to receive such email. This is the process through which GroupLotto
acquired the crash0922@aol.com address5. In other words, the user of email address
crash0922@aol.com registered at the Audiogalaxy site and in the process of doing so, agreed
through these attenuated agreements and sales of addresses to receive information and offers
via email from GroupLotto.

Ct. Rec. p. 316, Affidavit of Jared Brody, Exhibit B of

Defendant's Revised Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, f 7.

5

This is Mr. Gillman's email address.
6

6.

Gillman revoked the authorization6 of GroupLotto to send him spam email on

May 14, 2002. Ct. Rec. p. 363, Second Affidavit of Terry Gillman, Exhibit A of Plaintiff s
Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, f4.
7.

May 15, 2002, GroupLotto un-subscribed Gillman from their email list. Ct.

Rec. pp. 316-17, Affidavit of Jared Brody, Exhibit B of Defendant's Revised Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, f9.
8.

The Appellant has never given consent to Sprint to send email to him, nor does

he have a prior history of doing business with Sprint. Ct. Rec. p. 363, Second Affidavit of
Terry Gillman, Exhibit A of Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Summary
Judgment, \1.
9.

Although the original consent and business was done with Audiogalaxy, the

revocation on May 14, 2002 was sent to GroupLotto because they were the ones who had
acquired from Audiogalaxy the claimed transfer of the original consent. Ct. Rec. p. 363,
Second Affidavit of Terry Gillman, Exhibit A of Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum in
Opposition to Summary Judgment, f 4; Ct. Rec. pp. 316-17, Affidavit of Jared Brody,
Exhibit B of Defendant's Revised Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, f9.

6

Although there was never any relationship between Gillman and GroupLotto (it
was with Audiogalaxy), Gillman revoked any right GroupLotto had to send him
unsolicited email. The Court should note that such relationship as GroupLotto had was
entirely derivative from Audiogalaxy and was not direct with Mr. Gillman.
7

10.

GroupLotto is a subsidiary of Traffix, Inc. a Delaware Corporation. Ct. Rec.

p. 316, Affidavit of Jared Brody, Exhibit B of Defendant's Revised Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment, f 3. Gillman has not done business with Traffix, Inc.
either.

Ct. Rec. p. 363, Second Affidavit of Terry Gillman, Exhibit A of Plaintiff's

Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, f 7.
11.

. Traffix, Inc. contracted with Sprint to market certain Sprint products via email,

making Traffix, Inc. an advertiser for Sprint. Ct. Rec. p. 315, Affidavit of Jared Brody,
Exhibit B of Defendant's Revised Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, f 6.
12.

Several days after Plaintiff requested to be removed from the GroupLotto

emailing list, due to the large amount of unsolicited emails received from them, he received
another commercial advertisement for Sprint, soliciting Appellant to sign up for a Sprint
long distance program from GroupLotto, the subsidiary of Traffix, Inc. as Sprint's
advertising agent. Ct. Rec. p. 363, Second Affidavit of Terry Gillman, Exhibit A of
Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, <j[ 5; Ct. Rec. p.
508, Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant Sprint's Motion for Summary
Judgment,
13.

fl.
Gillman has no preexisting business or personal relationship with Sprint, who

is the one who caused the illegal email to be sent. Ct. Rec. p. 363, Second Affidavit of Terry

8

Gillman, Exhibit A of Plaintiffs Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Summary
Judgment, f 7 .
14.

The emails sent by Sprint were for the purpose of promoting the sale, lease, or

exchange of goods, services or real property over the Internet, and are therefore classified by
the statute mentioned above, as "commercial emails." Ct. Rec. p. 508, Memorandum
Decision and Order on Defendant Sprint's Motion for Summary Judgment, f5\ Ct. Rec. pp.
370-72, Email attached to Second Affidavit of Terry Gillman, Exhibit A of Plaintiff's
Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment.
15.

The emails sent by the Defendant were sent through a computer network,

which by statutory definition is two (2) or more computers which are interconnected to
exchange electronic messages, files, data, or other information. See Ut.Code Ann. § 13-36102(2).
16.

The email sent by Sprint through their advertiser to Gillman was unsolicited,

sent without his permission and was not sent as a result of a preexisting business or personal
relationship with the recipient. Ct. Rec. p. 363, Second Affidavit of Terry Gillman, Exhibit
A of Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, f 7.
17.

The email sent did not contain the legal name of Sprint. Ct. Rec. pp. 370-72,

email attached to Second Affidavit of Terry Gillman, Exhibit A of Plaintiff's Amended
Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment.
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18.

The email sent did not contain the correct street address of Sprint.

Ct. Rec.

pp. 370-72, email attached to Second Affidavit of Terry Gillman, Exhibit A of Plaintiff's
Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment.
19.

The email sent did not contain a valid Internet domain name for Sprint.

Ct.

Rec. pp. 370-72, email attached to Second Affidavit of Terry Gillman, Exhibit A of
Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment.
20.

The email sent did not contain a subject line which contained as the first four

(4) characters the letters and symbol: "ADV."

Ct. Rec. pp. 370-72, email attached to

Second Affidavit of Terry Gillman, Exhibit A of Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum in
Opposition to Summary Judgment.
21.

The email sent did not contain a convenient, no-cost mechanism to notify

sender not to send any future email, which mechanism includes sending a return email to a
valid, functioning return electronic address. Ct. Rec. pp. 370-72, email attached to Second
Affidavit of Terry Gillman, Exhibit A of Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum in Opposition
to Summary Judgment. Further, it was sent despite Terry Gillman's earlier efforts to avoid
getting such unwanted advertising by revoking his "consent." (See Fact No. 6, above.)
22.

The email sent did not contain conspicuously provided text in the email as

notice informing the Appellant that he may conveniently and at no cost be excluded from
future commercial email from Sprint.

Ct. Rec. pp. 370-72, email attached to Second

10

Affidavit of Terry Gillman, Exhibit A of Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum in Opposition
to Summary Judgment.
23.

On February 28, 2003, the Third District Court granted Sprint's Motion for

Summary Judgment based upon the erroneous conclusion that as a matter of law Gillman had
a preexisting relationship with GroupLotto, the actual sender of the email, and without regard
to Sprint's liability under the Statute as one "causing the email to be sent."

Ct. Rec. pp.

510-13, Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant Sprint's Motion for Summary
Judgment, H 16-26.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Appellant, pursuant to the Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually Explicit

Email Act, Utah Code §§ 13-36-101 to 13-36-105 (2002), cannot be found to have a
preexisting relationship, which subjects him to commercial emails, when Appellant has
affirmatively requested removal from that email list. The lower court erred when it found
a preexisting relationship to have existed. That relationship ended once the termination had
occurred, and the email was sent two days later.
2.

Appellant cannot in any event be found to have a preexisting relationship with

a business with whom Appellant has never done business merely because the SPAMMER
purchased a mailing list from another person with whom the Appellant had at one time done
business. This proposition, which was accepted by the lower court, essentially defeats the
Legislature's attempt to prevent SPAM. Any non-related party can purchase names from

11

others who had a business relationship and obtain a defense under the lower court's ruling.
That would defeat the statute and cannot be a reasonable reading of the statute.
3.

The term "preexisting relationship" as used in the Utah Act must require a

bona-fide commercial relationship as a result of which it would be reasonable to expect to
receive communications. It should not include merely a purchase of a name from another
party with such a bona-fide commercial relationship.

The language implies a currently

existing business relationship which predated the email, which relationship does not exist
here.
4.

Granting summary judgment when there are questions of fact and a Plaintiff

seeking discovery was wrong. The Appellant's Rule 56(f) motion should have been granted.
There remained some issues which required factual testimony and the resolution of facts in
favor of the non-moving party which prevented summary judgment or which required
discovery.

12

ARGUMENT
1.

Once a Business Relationship Is Terminated It Should Not Be Deemed to
Be Preexisting.

Although Gillman has never conceded there existed any sort of a relationship with
either GroupLotto, the physical sender of the email, or Sprint, who the lower court found to
have caused the email to be sent, the lower court still found there to be a commercial
relationship under the statute between Gillman and GroupLotto. Despite Sprint's allegations
to the contrary, there was never any relationship between Gillman and GroupLotto. Gillman
entered Audiogalaxy's website to download music. To be able to do that he had to become
a member, that occurred on April 14,2003. On May 14,2003, he contacted GroupLotto and
asked to have his email address taken from their email list because of the volume of SPAM
he was getting from them.

If there ever indeed was any sort of a relationship, it was

unknown to Gillman and revoked soon after it allegedly began. Notwithstanding these facts,
the lower court found there to be a relationship between the two, although it is difficult to
imagine how. Because it found such a relationship to exist, that will be addressed.
The lower court found that because Gillman once had a relationship7 with GroupLotto,
the sender of the offending email, that even after he had terminated that relationship, he
would forever be susceptible to unwanted SPAM emails from that sender, no matter who

7

That "relationship" was disputed. It arose, according to Sprint, as a result of
Gillman going to Audiogalaxy's website. However, Gillman's only transaction with
GroupLotto was telling it not to send him any more SPAM.
13

caused the email to be sent.

Ct. Rec. pp. 510-13, Memorandum Decision and Order on

Defendant Sprint's Motion for Summary Judgment, f][ 16-26. In effect this carves out a "safe
harbor" for SPAMMERS to use to send unsolicited email to such targets ad infinitum. It is
a judicially created innovation to the Statute and not a provision of the Statute itself. This
reading of the Statute appears to completely remove any teeth the Utah Statute has. Worse
still, this interpretation puts the teeth into the SPAMMERS, who now are provided a
permanent shield against liability for sending unwanted email advertising to Utah residents
with whom they never had a bona fide preexisting relationship.
The lower court's ruling fails to construe the meaning of the Statute according to its
plain language. As stated by the lower court, "[a] fundamental rule of statutory construction
is that statutes are to be construed according to their plain language." Arndt v. First
Interstate Bank, 991 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah 1999) (quoting O-Keefe v. Utah State Retirement
Bd., 956 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998)) and "where the statutory language is plain and
unambiguous, we do not look beyond the statute's plain meaning to divine legislative intent."
Horton v. Royal Order of the Sun, 821 P. 2d 1167, 1168 (Utah 1991).

Ct. Rec. pp. 511,

Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant Sprint's Motion for Summary Judgment,
f 19. Despite giving lip service to these principles, the lower court did violence to the
Statute's language and twisted its meaning beyond all recognition.
The plain language of the Statute clearly indicates that a qualifying relationship
(which we do not have here) can be terminated. Here the lower court has taken an

14

unqualified relationship and determined that it cannot be terminated.

Ever.

Once

established, the lower court has found that such a relationship is eternal. That alone requires
the lower court to be reversed. The Statute is being abused by the lower court's ruling. The
lower court's opinion would have been no different had that hydra-headed SPAM conspiracy
of Traffix-GroupLotto-Audiogalaxy-L90-MAXWORLDWIDE-Sprint8 wrote the opinion
with the express purpose of reversing the Utah Statute.
The Statute requires that the business relationship must exist at the time of the receipt
of the offending email. The pertinent portion of that Statute for this issue is found in § 1336-102(8)(b), which states: "A commercial email is not 'unsolicited' if the sender has a
preexisting business or personal relationship with the recipient." See Ut. Code Ann. § 13-36102(8)(b), provided as Exhibit in Appendix. This plainly requires the business relationship
to be in existence at the time of the email, which was not the case here.
Using the definition of "preexist" found in Webster's New World Dictionary (2d coll.
ed. 1986), the lower court found that "a relationship between two parties can 'preexist' if
it existed at any time in the past, even if that relationship has been subsequently
terminated."

Ct. Rec. p. 511, Mem. ^[21. (Emphasis added.) This however is not the

8

The cast of characters in this matter illustrates the pernicious nature of the SPAM
industry. It spreads across divergent entities the email addresses of active accounts such
as Mr. Gillman's. Once they know there is a functioning email address they rejoice and
spread the good news. Which in turn results in a deluge of SPAM from all the
conspirators. The lower court's opinion not only fails to prevent this, but actually
encourages it. Under its opinion "consent" gets used with reckless abandon to immunize
the entire industry.
15

wording of the Statute. It is an amendment and substantial alteration of the Statute. It
extends the potential relationship defense much further than could possibly have been
intended by the legislature. The Statute uses the word "preexisting" not "preexist." See Ut.
Code Ann. § 13-36-102(8)(b), provided in the Appendix to this brief.

The word

"preexisting" connotes current existence or that the object continues to exist, not just that it
existed at some remote time in the past. The addition of "ing" creates a present participle
which gives the word a present tense application. This, in conjunction with the present tense
verbiage used in the Statute, "has," can lead only to the conclusion that the relationship must
exist at the time a recipient receives the email. Such a reading is not only plain, but also
makes the Legislative intent actually accomplish something to prevent SPAM. The lower
court's interpretation eviscerates the Statute and renders any prior connection, however
remote, a defense.
Looking to other statutes that define similar terms, the Federal statute governing the
sending of unsolicited facsimiles, which is known as the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
of 1991 or the "TCPA" is found at 47 U.S.C. § 227. See 47 U.S.C. § 227 provided in the
Appendix. That statute prohibits the sending of unsolicited advertisements to fax machines.
Id. That statute implies a similar qualification of preexisting relationship to find liability for
solicitation. The statute uses the term "established business relationship" and defines it as
"a prior or existing relationship formed by a voluntary two-way communication between a
person or entity and a residential subscriber with or without an exchange of consideration,
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on the basis of an inquiry, application, purchase or transaction by the residential subscriber
regarding products or services offered by such person or entity, which relationship has not
been previously terminated by either party." (47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(4) (2003) (emphasis
added)). Although Appellant acknowledges these are different statutes passed by different
bodies of legislature, they deal with very similar abuses. The definition set by the United
States in this Federal statute, along with common sense, directly opposes the interpretation
of the lower court.
The lower court admits that its "reading of the statutory language excludes from the
Act's protection a potentially sizeable group of people." See Ct. Rec. p. 512, Mem. f 24.
It also concedes that "its reading of the Act's language could be questioned as creating an
outcome the legislature could not have intended." See Ct. Rec. p. 512, Mem. f 25. The
lower court is correct in this. Actually, the lower court could as well have admitted that its
interpretation cancels the Statute, by rendering all users of the Internet vulnerable to SPAM.
Under the lower court's interpretation the Statute has a loophole under which SPAM can
never be stopped (short of one continually changing email addresses). This cannot be the
intent of the legislature. Given the more accurate interpretation of the plain language of the
Statute, people should be able to terminate relationships with SPAMMERS.
All sides have agreed that Gillman terminated any business relationship with
GroupLotto on May 14, 2002. See Ct. Rec. p. 363, Second Affidavit of Terry Gillman,
Exhibit A of Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, f 4.
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At that point, he no longer could be found to have a preexisting relationship with GroupLotto
or any other party involved because it had been terminated.

Any possible business

relationship he had with GroupLotto before did not continue to exist. It was no longer
preexisting. Therefore the SPAM email he received advertising Sprint products two days
later was received unsolicited under the Statute.
2.

Appellant Never Had A Relationship with Sprint-

Mr. Gillman never had a relationship with Sprint. See Ct. Rec. p. 363, Second
Affidavit of Terry Gillman, Exhibit A of Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum in Opposition
to Summary Judgment, f 7. Mr. Gillman signed up for a membership on Audiogalaxy.com,
who is unquestionably not Sprint. At that time, according to Sprint, he also agreed to receive
emails from one of Audiogalaxy's sponsors, GroupLotto. Even if that were so, the
relationship was undisputedly terminated. At no time did Gillman ever create a relationship
with Sprint. Notwithstanding the lack of relationship with Sprint, the lower court correctly
found in its memorandum decision that Sprint was the entity responsible for sending the
offending email. See Ct. Rec. p. 509, Mem. ffr 11,12. The lower court's decision continues
to find that "liability attaches under the Act to '[e]ach person who sends or causes to be sent
an unsolicited commercial email.' § 13-36-103 (emphasis added). By hiring Traffix and its
subsidiary GroupLotto to advertise on its behalf, Sprint 'caused' the email at issue to be sent
to Gillman." See Ct. Rec. p. 509, Mem. f 12.
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The lower court found Sprint to be the liable party, not GroupLotto or Traffix or any
other party. See Ct. Rec. p. 509, Mem. f 12. This only makes common sense, since the email
was sent to advertise Sprint services and would not have been sent at all if Sprint had not
paid to have it sent. Therefore, Sprint is clearly responsible and the Statute clearly targets
one who "causes it to be sent" as Sprint did here. Nevertheless, the lower court found that
because Gillman once had a business relationship with GroupLotto, Sprint was clothed with
vicarious immunity under the Statute because the email was thereby "not unsolicited." See
Ct. Rec. pp. 511-12, Mem. f 22. With this ruling, the lower court effectively relieved Sprint
of its liability for causing an unsolicited email to be sent by its hired SPAMMER. The lower
court allowed Sprint to hire a defense from GroupLotto by acquiring vicariously a
"preexisting relationship." This inventive and fanciful determination goes well beyond the
language of the Statute. It is judicial activism and judicial legislating at a breathtaking
sweep. Section 13-36-103(3) Utah Code Annotated (2002) states, "If the recipient of an
unsolicited commercial email or an unsolicited sexually explicit email notifies the sender that
the recipient does not want to receive future commercial email or future sexually explicit
email, respectively, the sender may not send that recipient a commercial email or a sexually
explicit email, as the case may be, either directly or through a subsidiary or affiliate."
Ut. Code Ann. § 13-36-103(3) (Emphasis added). Just as paragraph 1 creates liability for
that entity that "sends or causes to be sent" paragraph 3 continues that liability to those who
directly or through an affiliate (as we have here), send offending emails. Sprint did not
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directly send the offending email, but its affiliate, GroupLotto, did at Sprint's insistence.
Gillman never had a relationship with Sprint, and any relationship with GroupLotto had been
terminated several days before it sent the offending email. Sprint never acquired a
relationship with Gillman merely by hiring a SPAMMER. Even if it were possible to hire
a SPAMMER to buy a relationship, that would not work in the facts of this case. Here
Gillman had terminated whatever relationship once existed.
3,

The Utah Act Must Require A Bona Fide Commercial Relationship.

The term "preexisting relationship" as used in the Utah Act must require a bona-fide
commercial relationship as a result of which it would be reasonable to expect to receive
communications. It should not include merely a purchase of a name from another party as
we have here.
Gillman entered Audiogalaxy.com to download music and ended up a member of
Audiogalaxy. As a result of that membership agreement, the lower court has ruled that he
is now a target for any SPAMMER for the rest of his natural life as long as some arguable
connection can be attached to Audiogalaxy. A portion of the Audiogalaxy membership
agreement allegedly provides that the member agree to receive information and offers from
GroupLotto. See Ct. Rec. p. 313, Affidavit Kate Vein, f 4. There has been no discovery to
explore (or prove) that agreement. Nevertheless, the lower court decided without the benefit
of actual proof or discovery that the alleged relationship between Gillman and GroupLotto
bars Gillman from any protection under Utah's Statute. This is so even after termination of
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the only agreement which ever existed. The lower court effectively has concluded that
GroupLotto now has the right to send Appellant as much email as it wants, even though
Gillman has requested it not send him any more email. In fact, the decision of the lower
court makes it so that GroupLotto can now sell Appellant's email address to whatever
SPAMMER it chooses along with some form of "assignment" and Gillman would have no
recourse. In effect, the lower court has inexplicably turned the Utah Anti-Spam Statute into
a mechanism to protect SPAMMERS and to increase the volume of SPAM sent to Utah
residents. It is the sort of raw judicial activism which should shock any court who feels
restrained by Legislative action. Clearly what the lower court did could not be the intended
effect of the Utah Act. Even if there once existed a bona fide business relationship between
Gillman and Audiogalaxy, this should not open the door to an unlimited supply of SPAM
from Sprint. Once any bona fide relationship ceased to exist, GroupLotto and all of it's
affiliates should be barred from sending junk email to Gillman.
Additionally, although admittedly the email was sent by GroupLotto, the email was
from Sprint. It advertised Sprint's products. It sought to sell Sprint to Gillman. It targeted
Gillman specifically because he didn't have a relationship with Sprint. Sprint intended to
benefit from sending it to Gillman. Sprint caused the email to be sent. It paid for and
arranged for the email to be sent. Therefore it must be with Sprint that a bona fide
preexisting business relationship must exist for Sprint to have immunity from liability. Utah
Code Ann. Section 13-36-103 has three subparts. Every one of the subparts contains
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language related to those who cause the email to be sent. Section 13-36-103(1) provides:
"Each person who... causes to be sent" has violated the requirements. Sprint caused this to
be sent.

13-36-103(2) provides: "A person who... causes to be sent" has violated the

requirements. Sprint is once again responsible. 13-36-103(3) provides that it is unlawful
to send this email spam "either directly or through a subsidiary or affiliate." Sprint caused
it to be sent. Sprint remains responsible. Once again the clear provisions of the Statute reach
Sprint. The lower court made not just seismic, but tectonic changes to the Legislative
enactment.
The argument that Sprint contracted with GroupLotto and is thereby shielded from
liability is an argument that finds no support in the legislation. In fact, that argument is both
anticipated by and defeated in the language chosen by the legislature. Sprint was the sole
beneficiary of this email. The only thing GroupLotto received was payment from Sprint, for
sending a blizzard of emails. It is with GroupLotto that Gillman terminated the alleged
relationship, not Sprint. But it is Sprint that is liable under the Statute and finding of the
lower court. It is with Sprint that the court must find a bona fide business relationship that
is preexisting at the time the email is received. To find that the relationship may be with any
so called affiliate of GroupLotto is to completely open the door to any SPAMMER to whom
they sell an email address. That remakes the Utah Statute into the "Utah Pro-Spam Act."
A curious result indeed.
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4

Appellant's Motion for Discovery under Rule 56(f) Should Have Been
Granted.

The standard for the grant or denial of summary judgment is well known: [Sjummary
judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ut.R.Civ.P.
56(c). (If the movant bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact, the nonmovant may not rest on its pleadings but must set forth specific facts showing
a genuine issue for trial as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of
proof. See Waddoups v. The Amalgamated Sugar Co., 54 P.3d 1054 (Utah 2003).
An issue is genuine if there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier
of fact could resolve the issue either way. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242,
248[, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202] (1986). An issue of fact is "material" if under the
substantive law it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim. See id. If a party that
would bear the burden of persuasion at trial does not come forward with sufficient evidence
on all essential elements of its prima facie case, all issues concerning all other elements of
the claim and any defenses become immaterial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317,
322-23[, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265] (1986).
The movant bears the initial burden of making a prima facie demonstration of the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
See Celotex, All U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In so doing, a movant that will not bear the
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burden of persuasion at trial need not negate the nonmovant's claim. See id. Such a movant
may make its prima facie demonstration simply by pointing out to the court a lack of
evidence for the nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant's claim. See id. If the
movant carries this initial burden, the nonmovant that would bear the burden of persuasion
at trial may not simply rest upon its pleadings; the burden shifts to the nonmovant to go
beyond the pleadings and "set forth specific fact" that would be admissible in evidence in the
event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant. Ut.R.Civ.P.
56(e); See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888-89[, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111
L.Ed.2d 695] (1990); Celotex, All U.S. at 324,106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, All U.S. at 248[,
106 S.Ct. 2505]. To accomplish this, the facts must be identified by reference to affidavits,
deposition transcripts, or specific exhibits incorporated therein. See Thomas v. Wichita CocaCola Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir.) cert denied, 506 U.S. 1013[, 113 S.Ct.
635, 121 L.Ed.2d 566] (1992). Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670-71 (10th
Cir. 1998).
In this case, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment before either party had
any opportunity to begin taking discovery. The only evidence supplied was in the form of
affidavit testimony which could only be seen as self-serving and incomplete. The language
of Toebleman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 130 F.2d 1016 (3rd Cir. 1942) is
particularly applicable to the instant case.
"The case must, therefore, go back for further proceedings as to this cause of
action in order to afford the plaintiffs an opportunity to produce evidence of
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the facts necessary to support the relief for which they ask. It is obvious that
this evidence must come largely from the defendants. This case illustrates the
danger of founding a judgment in favor of one party upon his own version of
facts within his sole knowledge as set forth in affidavits prepared ex parte.
Cross-examination of the party and a reasonable examination of his records by
the other party frequently bring forth further facts which place a very different
light upon the picture. The plaintiffs should, therefore, be given a reasonable
opportunity, under proper safeguards, to take the depositions and have the
discovery which they seek."
M a t 1022.
Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for exactly this type of relief.
That rule states:
"Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just."
The Utah Supreme Court has held on "numerous occasions that rule 56(f) motions
opposing a summary judgment motion on the ground that discovery has not been completed
should be granted liberally unless they are deemed dilatory or lacking in merit." Salt Lake
County v. Western Dairymen Coop, 48 P.3d 910 (Utah 2002) (citing Price Dev. Co. v. Orem
City, 995 P.2d 1237 (Utah 2000); Crossland Sav. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1994); and
Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 1984)).
In this case, Plaintiff's Motion was made and filed in October, 2002, discovery was
not completed, in fact the process was never allowed to begin. See Ct. Rec. pp. 194-99. There
were no interrogatories, no requests for admission, no requests for production, no
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depositions. These methods are necessary to flush out the facts and to determine plaintiffs
claims on the merits, not on the pleadings. The Plaintiff made claims and the Defendant
made its own claims in opposition creating a situation of "he said, she said." There was no
flushing out of the facts, none was allowed.
Discovery would have allowed the parties to determine several material facts,
including a determination of the actual amount of time and by what process an email message
to be sent by any Spammer in the industry can be removed from an emailing list, or more
specifically, the actual amount of time and process an email message sent by GroupLotto
could by removed from an emailing list, and the existence or non-existence of any business
relationship between Appellant and Appellee. Additionally, the determination by the lower
court was based entirely upon the affidavits of the parties. The discovery process would be
used to verify or contradict the testimony actually submitted. Because there was no
discovery, there was no opportunity to do so.
Plaintiff's motion was submitted in a timely fashion, with pertinent rationale and
necessity. Notwithstanding that and the Utah Supreme Court's many findings that Rule 56(f)
motions should be granted liberally, in this case, it was not. Appellant respectfully requests
this Court correct the lower court's error by remanding this matter for further discovery and
determination.
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CONCLUSION
The lower court erred in every respect in its ruling. It adopted a judicially amended
Statute which bore no relationship to what the Utah Legislature intended. It did not only
violence, but effected a reversal of the Statute's effect and intent. It adopts a "safe harbor"
provision for immunizing SPAMMERS from liability. It stretches the language into such
distortions and distensions that we have, under the lower court's view, a "Utah Pro-Spam
Act" in place of what the Legislature was attempting to enact. It ignores common sense,
statutory language and rudimentary rules of grammar. In short, it fails to pass muster legally,
grammatically, and 'common-sensically.'
Further, discovery was essential before making the factual determinations below.
Discovery was prohibited, in violation of the Rules.

Summary Judgment was not

appropriate.

DATED this

"7 ~ day of October, 2003.
NELSON^NUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN

Denver- (J. Snuffer, Jr.
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM
1.

Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant Sprint's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

2.

Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

3.

Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually Explicit Email Act, Utah Code §§1336-101 to 13-36-105 (2002).

4.

47 U.S.C. § 227 (Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991).

5.

47 C.F.R. §64.1200(2003).
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ADDENDUM 1

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SANDY COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TERRY GILLMAN,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON
DEF SPRINTS MO FO

vs.

Case No: 020406640

SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS,
Defendant.

Judge: DENISE P. LINDBERG
Date: 2/28/2003

Clerk: lisam
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant Sprint's Motion for
Summary Judgment: Decision and Order: Because the email at issue in
this case does not fit the statutory defintion of and "unsolicited
commercial email11 under the plain language of the Act, the Court
GRANTS Defendant Sprint's motion for summary judgment. So ordered.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SANDY DEPARTMENT

%

- ^
%

TERRY GILLMAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS
COMPANY, L.P. and JOHN DOES one
through ten whose true names are unknown,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER
ON DEFENDANT SPRINT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Case No. 020406640
Judge Denise Posse Lindberg

f1
Before the Court is Defendant Sprint Communications' ("Sprint") motion for summary
judgment, filed November 1,2002. Defendant's Motion and Plaintiffs Opposition were fully
briefed and heard, pursuant to notice, on December 10,2002. The parties were represented by
counsel and, following the motion hearing, each party was granted leave to file a five page
supplemental memorandum. A Notice to Submit for Decision was filed by Defendant on January
7,2003. Having fully considered the argument of the parties and the applicable law, the Court
now GRANTS Sprint's motion for summary judgment.
\2
Sprint's arguments for summary judgment are based on both statutory and constitutional
grounds. Recognizing that the court will not rule on the constitutional arguments unless the
motion cannot be granted on statutory grounds, Sprint offers four statutory grounds in support of
its claim that it is not liable under Utah's Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually Explicit Email
Act, Utah Code §§ 13-36-101 to 13-36-105 (2002) (the "Act"), for sending unsolicited
commercial email ("UCE") to Plaintiff. ^Any one of those statutory arguments, if sustained,
would be sufficient to resolve the case in Sprint's favor. For the reasons set forth below, three of
Sprint's statutory arguments are not persuasive. The fourth, however, requires that summary
judgment be rendered in Sprint's favor. Because the Court grants summary judgment to Sprint
on statutory grounds, it need not reach Sprint's constitutional arguments.1 See Utah v. Wood, 648
P.2d 71, 82 (Utah 1982) (citing Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240 (Utah 1980)) ("It is a
fundamental rule that we should avoid addressing a constitutional issue unless required to do
so.")

'Sprint claims the Act runs afoul of^e^re^fl'jPouitewiBi Amendments (Freedom of Speech and Due
Process clauses), as weU^s.^xeJon^tCbnim^ce clause;

UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1f3
On April 14, 2002, plaintiff, Gillman, registered on the Audio Galaxy website and, by so
doing, agreed to receive promotional email. Through an intermediary, Audio Galaxy sold its
email addresses to Traffix, Inc. ("Traffix").2 Traffix and its subsidiaries contract with businesses
to send promotional email to consenting individuals.
f4

On May 6, 2002, the Act became effective.

1f5
On or about May 14, 2002, Traffix, Inc., through its subsidiary, GroupLotto, initiated a
campaign to send promotional email to those addresses it had purchased. The promotional
emails were intended to advertise Sprint's Nickel Nights long-distance telephone service.
1f6
That same day, May 14,2002, Gillman requested removal from GroupLottofs email
distribution list.
1f7
Gillman's name and email address were actually removed from GroupLotto's email
distribution list a day later, on May 15,2002. However, they were not immediately removed
from the queue of emails advertising Sprint's Nickel Nights. As a result, on May 16, 2002,
Gillman received an email from GroupLotto advertising Sprint's Nickel Nights.
T[8
On May 28,2002, Gillman filed a class action lawsuit against Sprint, alleging that Sprint
sent him UCE in violation of the Act.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1f9
The Court may award summary judgment only if the Court finds there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the Court concludes that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah
1991). The Court must draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
f 10 Issues of statutory interpretation, as questions of law, are appropriate for summary
judgment. The Court has a duty to interpret statutes so as to uphold their constitutionality
whenever possible. See Mountain States Tel & Tel Co. v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464,467 (Utah
1989) ("If there are alternative statutory constructions possible, one rendering a statute

2

There is no evidence before the Court concerning the terms under which Gillman consented to receive
emails as a result of his enrollment in the Audio Galaxy site, nor as to whether the consent expressly extended to
subsequent purchasers of Audio Galaxy's email lists. Without information one way or another on this issue, one
could argue that Audio Galaxy's sale of Gillman's personal information to Traffix and GroupLotto may have been
an unauthorized act by Audio Galaxy. Notably, Gillman has never raised this issue so it has been waived. To the
contrary, Gillman concedes his relationship with GroupLotto, but argues that he terminated the relationship before
the Sprint email was sent. Indeed, in order to attempt to hold Sprint legally liable in this case, Gillman has no
choice but to rely on the agency relationship between GroupLotto and Sprint
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constitutional and the other unconstitutional, the former should be adopted.").
ANALYSIS
1fl 1 Sprint's four statutory arguments dispute liability on the grounds that: (a) Sprint itself was
not the entity that sent the email; (b) the email was sent accidentally; (c) Plaintiff consented to
receipt of the email; and (d) Plaintiff had a pre-existing relationship with GroupLotto, the actual
sender of the email.
1J12 Sprint's first argument is wrong as a matter of law. While it is true that the email was
sent by GroupLotto rather than by Sprint itself, liability attaches under the Act to ,f[e]ach person
who sends or causes to be sent an unsolicited commercial email." § 13-36-103 (emphasis
added). By hiring Traffix and its subsidiary GroupLotto to advertise on its behalf, Sprint
"caused" the email at issue to be sent to Gillman.
f 13 Sprint's second argument, that transmitting the subject email was unintentional, places
material issues of fact in dispute; accordingly, it is not an appropriate ground for summary
judgment. Because Gillman had previously agreed to receive commercial advertisement,
GroupLotto, at Sprint's behest, identified Gillman as one of a group of intended recipients of the
Sprint advertisement. Webster's New World Dictionary (2d coll. ed. 1986) defines "intentional"
as an act that is "done with intent," and "done purposely." "Intention" is further defined, inter
aha, as "a determination to do a specified thing"; "the general word implying having something
in mind as a plan or design." Id. Cf. Utah Code §76-2-103 (in criminal context, one acts
intentionally when it is his conscious objective to engage in the conduct or cause the result).
There is no dispute that GroupLotto disenrolled Gillmanfromits list of consenting recipients the
day before the offending email was transmitted. The issue is why Gillman's name and email
were not simultaneously deleted from the queue. As a result, the following material issues of fact
are in dispute:
(A) Whether the queue of the Sprint advertisements was actually assembled prior to, or
subsequent to, receipt of Gillman's disenrollment request.
(B) If the advertisement queue was assembled prior to receipt of the disenrollment
request, whether GroupLotto intentionally decided not to incur the costs of removing
Gillman's name and email from the pre-established queue for the Nickel Nights
advertisement. And, if so, whether Sprint should be liable for that decision.
(C) Whether technological limits made it impossible to remove Gillman's name and
emailfromthe already established queue (which, under the right set of facts could
support the claim that transmission of the advertising email to Gillman should be legally
construed to be "unintentional").
Tfl4 Sprint's third argument, that Gillman consented to receipt of the email, also raises
material, disputed issues of fact precluding entry of summary judgment. Sprint correctly argues
that "[t]he statute says nothing about e-mails sent before a withdrawal of consent has been

received by the sender." Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment [Revised], at 3. From that premise Sprint argues that "the Act must be read to provide
for a reasonable period of time following the withdrawal of permission during which the
previously sent messages may be delivered without liability attaching to the sender." Id. Of
course, the facts of this case do not correspond to Sprint's argument since the
sender-GroupLotto-in fact received and processed the disenrollment request a day before the
offending email was actually transmitted to Gillman. Sprint's argument rests on the premise that
once an email is in the queue it has been "sent." There are no facts before the Court to support
that claim. All that Sprint has argued in its brief is that it is common in the industry for a
disenrollment request to take 2-3 days to process. That does not answer the question whether it
was reasonable for GroupLotto not to purge the email to Gillman from the advertising queue,
given that in this case GroupLotto was able to purge Gillman from its list of subscribers in
advance of the email's transmission.3
HI 5 In addition to the above-referenced material issues of fact in dispute, there are several
legal issues that have yet to be fully addressed by the parties. For example, the parties have
provided no legal analysis as to when, under the facts of this case, a commercial email should be
deemed "sent," or what legal considerations militate in favor, or against, construing the Act to
permit a "reasonable period" of disenrollment irrespective of actual technical capabilities. Each
of these issues bears directly on the question whether Gillman's consent could have been legally
withdrawn with respect to advertisements that were then in the queue. Consequently, summary
judgment for Sprint cannot be granted on any of the preceding grounds.
1J16 Although thefirstthree statutory arguments fail to support entry of summary judgment in
Sprint's behalf, the Court agrees that summary judgment is appropriate as to the fourth statutory
ground. Sprint's final argument is that the email at issue did not violate the Act because it fell
within the Act's "preexisting business relationship" exception. Specifically, Sprint relies on
Gillman's preexisting business relationship with GroupLotto to argue that the email was, by
definition, not "unsolicited."
1(17 Among other things, the Act proscribes the sending of "unsolicited" commercial emails if
they do not comply with the Act's requirements. A commercial email is "unsolicited" if it is
received "without the recipient's express permission." § 13-36-102(8)(a). However, "[a]
commercial email is not 'unsolicited1 if the sender has a preexisting business or personal
relationship with the sender." Id. § (b) (emphasis added). Gillman does not dispute that he had
a preexisting business relationship with GroupLotto. As Sprint's agent, expressly hired to
disseminate Sprint's Nickel-Nights advertising campaign, GroupLotto's relationship to Gillman
is properly imputed to Sprint.
T[l 8 Gillman claims that Sprint's message was "unsolicited" because he had disenrolled
before the email was sent. From that premise Gillman argues that Sprint is liable, under the Act,
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As noted previously, the parties have also not addressed the technological feasibility of
"instantaneous"disenrollment nor ihe^sdciated economic costs,

because the commercial email message failed to comply with the Act's express requirements.
The plain language of the Act renders Gillman's argument unavailing.
1f 19 "A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that statutes are to be construed
according to their plain language." Arndt v. First Interstate Bank, 991 P.2d 584, 586,1999 UT
91 f 10 (quoting O'Keefe v. Utah State Retirement Bd, 956 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998)).
ff
[W]here the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we do not look beyond the statute's
plain meaning to divine legislative intent." Horton v. Royal Order of the Sun, 821 P.2d 1167,
1168 (Utah 1991). See also Olson v. SamuelMclntyre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah 1998)
("We do not look beyond the plain language unless wefindambiguity").
1f20 Here, the Act provides that "[i]f the recipient of an unsolicited commercial email...
notifies the sender that the recipient does not want to receive future commercial email... from
the sender, the sender may not send that recipient a commercial email... either directly or
through a subsidiary." §13-36-103(3) (emphasis added). Because a commercial email is, by
definition, not "unsolicited" if it is based on a preexisting business relationship, this subsection
only applies to prohibit the sending of a second (or subsequent) unsolicited email to recipients
with whom the merchant or advertiser did not have a preexisting business relationship.
1J21 The Act is silent as to how a recipient like Gillman, who indisputably had a preexisting
business relationship with the commercial email sender, can effectively terminate that
relationship in order to claim the protection of the Act. By definition, to "preexist" means "to
exist previously or before." Webster's New World Dictionary (2d coll. ed. 1986). Thus, a
relationship between two parties can "preexist" if it existed at any time in the past, even if that
relationship has been subsequently terminated.4 That is true irrespective of when in time that
relationship existed. Thus, Gillman continued to have a preexisting business relationship with
GroupLotto.
%L2 Because of Gillman's preexisting business relationship with GroupLotto, the email
Gillman received was, by definition, not unsolicited. Under the Act, recipients of unwanted
commercial email can only disenroll themselves if the email received is an "unsolicited
commercial email." § 13-36-103(3). The Court concludes that, for purposes of the Act,
Gillman's attempt to disenroll himself-and thus terminate (he business relationship with

4

The legislature is presumed to use language in its common and ordinary meaning. Thus, unless the
legislature expressly defines the terms or phrases it uses in its enactments, the Court will interpret those terms or
phrases as generally understood. In common usage, a"preexisting business relationship" clearly encompasses not
only present business relationships but also any such relationship that may have existed at some point in the past,
even if it no longer exists. Thus, persons have preexisting business relationships with former landlords or
employers, even if those relationships no longer exist. Had the legislature intended to limit the application of the
definition to a presently existing business relationship, it would have qualified its language to set a time limit to the
relationship. Not having done so, this Court would be overstepping its authority to impute a time limitation to the
language the legislature adopted. Sec Assoc. Gen. Contrs. v. Bd. of OH Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112KBQ, 38 P.3d
291, 301n(When statutory language is unambiguous, the Court is not at liberty to "infer substantive tenns into the
text that are not already there"), quoting Berrett v. Purser &JEdyyards> 876 P*2d |67,370 (Utah X99$$eealsoJn

re I.M.L. v. Utah;2Q02 UTJimi25,rrjM —.

GroupLotto and Sprint-was ineffective.
1f23 Gillman's claim that the Nickel Nights advertisement did not comply with the Act's
requirements that commercial emails include specific language in the subject line is also
unavailing. By its terms, those requirements also apply only to "unsolicited commercial
emailfs]," see Utah Code §13-36-103(l)(a), (b), (c), and (d) (2002). Thus, the fact that the email
message received by Gillman did not comply with those requirements does not trigger liability
for GroupLotto or Sprint.5
Tf24 To be sure, this reading of the statutory language excludes from the Act's protection a
potentially sizeable group of people. Given the unqualified nature of the Act's language, the
exclusion precludes any challenges under the Act that are brought by commercial email
recipients who have had any prior business relationship with the sender.
K25 The Court concedes that its reading of the Act's language could be questioned as creating
an outcome the legislature could not have intended. As noted previously, however, the best
evidence of legislative intent is the language the legislature enacted into law. Further, the Court
is precluded from examining other indicators of legislative intent if, as is the case here, the
language is unambiguous.6 If the Court's interpretation of the Act's language does not adequately
reflect the legislature's intentions, the legislature is better positioned than this Court to determine
whether the statutory language should be clarified.

5

Gillman makes no claims under §13-36-103(2), but the same analysis would apply to bar liability under
the Act in cases where a recipient with a "preexisting business relationship" to a commercial email sender
complained of improper use of another's domain name, or misrepresentation of point of origin of an email message.
6

Although the Court rests its holding squarely on the statutory language, there are reasonable bases to
believe this outcome is not inconsistent with the statutory scheme. Legislatures have the discretion to address
identified problems, such as the problem of "spammers," one step at a time. Thus, even if the scheme adopted by
the legislature does not eliminate all unwanted commercial email, the drafters of the Act may have viewed it as an
important "first step" in addressing the issue, with further steps to follow. That is an especially plausible argument
in cases where, as here, die legislature is venturing into a relatively new and judicially untested area of legislation.
It is also possible that the drafters may have intentionally structured the Apt's language as part of a legislative
compromise, in order tb secure its passage. In any event, this Court will not second-guess the legislature when the
statutory language is slear.

DECISION AND ORDER
%26 Because the email at issue in this case does not fit the statutory definition of an
"unsolicited commercial email" under the plain language of the Act, the Court GRANTS
Defendant Sprint's motion for summary judgment. So ordered.
This 28th day of February, 2003. By the Court:
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Rule 54

trial juror in the trial of a civil action. Such objections must be
heard and disposed of by the court in the same manner as a
motion.
PART VEL JUDGMENT
Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules
includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A
judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of
a master, or the record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in
an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved,
the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an
express determination by the court that there is no just reason
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction,
any order or other form of decision, however designated, which
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the
action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other
form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights
and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment.
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a
judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall
grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered
is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in
his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of
several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on
each side as between or among themselves.
(c)(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not
be different in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically
prayed for in the demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.

(d)(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision
therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in these
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing
party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however,
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs
of the action, other than costs in connection with such appeal
or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers
and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by
law.
(d)(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must
within five days after the entry of judgment serve upon the
adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a
memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge
the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been
necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party
dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days
after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have
the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the judgment was
rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or
at the time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the
findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of
judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed
on the date judgment is entered.
(d)(3) [Deleted.]
(d)(4) [Deleted.]
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(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The
clerk must include in any judgment signed by him any interest
on the verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and
the costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained. The
clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed or
ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment,
insert the amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for
that purpose, and make a similar notation thereof in the
register of actions and in the judgment docket.
Rule 55. Default.
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise
defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to
appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party.
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as
follows:
(b)(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk
shall enter judgment for the amount claimed and costs against
the defendant if:
(b)(1)(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear;
(b)(1)(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent
person;
(b)(1)(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1); and
(b)(1)(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum
certain or for a sum that can be made certain by computation.
(b)(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a
judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in
order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into
effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the
amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment
by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter,
the court may conduct such hearings or order such references
as it deems necessary and proper.
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court
may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default
has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with
Rule 60(b).
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the party entitled to the
judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a
party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all
cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of
Rule 54(c).
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof.
No judgment by default shall be entered against the state of
Utah or against an officer or agency thereof unless the
claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence
satisfactory to the court.
Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for
summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor
upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as
to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed and served in accordance
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with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine
issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under
this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for
all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the
evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good
faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy,
including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial
shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required.
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits.
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported
as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment,
if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from
the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment
or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained
or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make
such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the
satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits
presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order
the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the
affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's
fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged
guilty of contempt.
Rule 57. Declaratory judgments.
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to Chapter 33 of Title 78, U.C.A. 1953, shall be in
accordance with these rules, and the right to trial by jury may
be demanded under the circumstances and in the manner
provided in Rules 38 and 39. The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory
relief in cases where it is appropriate. The court may order a
speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and
may advance it on the calendar.
Rule 58A. Entry.
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless the court
otherwise directs and subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b),

Rule 58B

judgment upon the verdict of a jury shall be forthwith signed
by the clerk and filed. If there is a special verdict or a general
verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories returned
by a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the
appropriate judgment which shall be forthwith signed by the
clerk and filed.
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided in Subdivision (a) hereof and Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge and filed with the clerk.
(c) When judgment entered; notation in register of actions
and judgment docket. A judgment is complete and shall be
deemed entered for all purposes, except the creation of a lien
on real property, when the same is signed and filed as herein
above provided. The clerk shall immediately make a notation
of the judgment in the register of actions and the judgment
docket.
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. A copy of the
signed judgment shall be promptly served by the party preparing it in the manner provided in Rule 5. The time for filing
a notice of appeal is not affected by the requirement of this
provision.
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party dies after a
verdict or decision upon any issue of fact and before judgment,
judgment may nevertheless be rendered thereon.
(f) Judgment by confession. Whenever a judgment by confession is authorized by statute, the party seeking the same
must file with the clerk of the court in which the judgment is
to be entered a statement, verified by the defendant, to the
following effect:
(f)(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money due or to
become due, it shall concisely state the claim and that the sum
confessed therefor is justly due or to become due;
(f)(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the purpose of
securing the plaintiff against a contingent liability, it must
state concisely the claim and that the sum confessed therefor
does not exceed the same;
(f)(3) It must authorize the entry ofjudgment for a specified
sum.
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the statement, and
enter in the judgment docket, a judgment of the court for the
amount confessed, with costs of entry, if any.
Rule 58B. Satisfaction of judgment.
(a) Satisfaction by owner or attorney. A judgment may be
satisfied, in whole or in part, as to any or all of the judgment
debtors, by the owner thereof, or by the attorney of record of
the judgment creditor where no assignment of the judgment
has been filed and such attorney executes such satisfaction
within eight years after the entry of the judgment, in the
following manner: (1) by written instrument, duly acknowledged by such owner or attorney; or (2) by acknowledgment of
such satisfaction signed by the owner or attorney and entered
on the docket of the judgment in the county where first
docketed, with the date affixed and witnessed by the clerk.
Every satisfaction of a part of the judgment, or as to one or
more of the judgment debtors, shall state the amount paid
thereon or for the release of such debtors, naming them.
(b) Satisfaction by order of court. When a judgment shall
have been fully paid and not satisfied of record, or when the
satisfaction of judgment shall have been lost, the court in
which such judgment was recovered may, upon motion and
satisfactory proof, authorize the attorney of the judgment
creditor to satisfy the same, or may enter an order declaring
the same satisfied and direct satisfaction to be entered upon
the docket.
(c) Entry by clerk. Upon receipt of a satisfaction of judgment, duly executed and acknowledged, the clerk shall file the
same with the papers in the case, and enter it on the register
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(5) whether the franchisees of the same line-make in
that relevant market area are providing adequate service
to consumers for the powersport vehicles of the line-make,
which shall include the adequacy of the powersport vehicle sale and service facilities, equipment, supply of vehicle
parts, and qualified service personnel.
2002
13-35-307. Franchisor's repurchase obligations upon
termination or noncontinuation of franchise.
(1) Upon the termination or noncontinuation of a franchise
by the franchisor, the franchisor shall pay the franchisee:
(a) the franchisee's cost of new, undamaged, and unsold
powersport vehicles in the franchisee's inventory acquired
from the franchisor or another franchisee of the same
line-make representing both the current model year at
the time of termination or noncontinuation and the immediately prior model year vehicles:
(i) plus any charges made by the franchisor, for
distribution, delivery, or taxes;
(ii) plus the franchisee's cost of any accessories
added on the vehicle shall be repurchased; and
(iii) less all allowances paid or credited to the
franchisee by the franchisor;
(b) the cost of all new, undamaged, and unsold supplies, parts, and accessories as set forth in the franchisor's
catalog at the time of termination or noncontinuation for
the supplies, parts, and accessories, less all allowances
paid or credited to the franchisee by the franchisor;
(c) the fair market value, but not less than the franchisee's depreciated acquisition cost of each undamaged sign
owned by the franchisee that bears a common name, trade
name, or trademark of the franchisor if acquisition of the
sign was recommended or required by the franchisor. If a
franchisee has a sign with multiple manufacturers listed,
the franchisor is only responsible for its pro rata portion of
the sign;
(d) the fair market value, but not less than the franchisee's depreciated acquisition cost of all special tools,
equipment, and furnishings acquired from the franchisor
or sources approved by the franchisor that were recommended or required by the franchisor and are in good and
usable condition; and
(e) the cost of transporting, handling, packing, and
loading powersport vehicles, supplies, parts, accessories,
signs, special tools, equipment, and furnishings.
(2) The franchisor shall pay the franchisee the amounts
specified in Subsection (1) within 90 days after the tender of
the property to the franchisor if the franchisee:
(a) has clear title to the property; and
(b) is in a position to convey title to the franchisor.
(3) If repurchased inventory and equipment are subject to a
security interest, the franchisor may make payment jointly to
the franchisee and to the holder of the security interest. 2002
CHAPTER 36
UNSOLICITED COMMERCIAL AND SEXUALLY
EXPLICIT EMAIL ACT
Section
13-36-101.
13-36-102.
13-36-103.
13-36-104.
13-36-105.

Title.
Definitions.
Unsolicited commercial or sexually explicit
email — Requirements.
Criminal penalty.
Civil action for violation — Election on damages — Costs and attorney fees — Defense.

13-36-101. Title.
This chapter is known as the 'Unsolicited Commercial and
Sexually Explicit Email Act."
2002

13-36-103

13-36-102. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Commercial" means for the purpose of promoting
the sale, lease, or exchange of goods, services, or real
property.
(2) "Computer network" means two or more computers
that are interconnected to exchange electronic messages,
files, data, or other information.
(3) "Email" means an electronic message, file, data, or
other information that is transmitted:
(a) between two or more computers, computer networks, or electronic terminals; or
(b) within a computer network.
(4) "Email address" means a destination, commonly
expressed as a string of characters, to which email may be
sent or delivered.
(5) "Email service provider" means a person that:
(a) is an intermediary in the transmission of email
from the sender to the recipient; or
(b) provides to end users of email service the
ability to send and receive email.
(6) "Internet domain name" means a globally unique,
hierarchical reference to an Internet host or service,
assigned through centralized Internet authorities, comprising a series of character strings separated by periods,
with the right-most string specifying the top of the hierarchy.
(7) (a) "Sexually explicit email" means an email that
contains, promotes, or contains an electronic link to
material that is harmful to minors, as defined in
Section 76-10-1201.
(b) An email is a "sexually explicit email" if it
meets the definition in Subsection (7)(a), even if the
email also meets the definition of a commercial email.
(8) (a) "Unsolicited" means without the recipient's express permission, except as provided in Subsection
(8Kb).
(b) A commercial email is not "unsolicited" if the
sender has a preexisting business or personal relationship with the recipient.
2002
13-36-103. Unsolicited commercial or sexually explicit
email — Requirements.
(1) Each person who sends or causes to be sent an unsolicited commercial email or an unsolicited sexually explicit email
through the intermediary of an email service provider located
in the state or to an email address held by a resident of the
state shall:
(a) conspicuously state in the email the sender's:
(i) legal name;
(ii) correct street address; and
(iii) valid Internet domain name;
(b) include in the email a subject line that contains:
(i) for a commercial email, "ADV:" as the first four
characters; or
(ii) for a sexually explicit email, "ADV:ADULT" as
the first nine characters;
(c) provide the recipient a convenient, no-cost mechanism to notify the sender not to send any future email to
the recipient, including:
(i) return email to a valid, functioning return electronic address; and
(ii) for a sexually explicit email and if the sender
has a toll-free telephone number, the sender's tollfree telephone number; and
(d) conspicuously provide in the text of the email a
notice that:
(i) informs the recipient that the recipient may
conveniently and at no cost be excluded from future

13-36-104

564

COMMERCE AND TRADE

commercial or sexually explicit email, as the case
may be, from the sender; and
(ii) for a sexually explicit email and if the sender
has a toll-free telephone number, includes the sender's valid, toll-free telephone number t h a t the recipient may call to be excluded from future email from
the sender.
(2) A person who sends or causes to be sent an unsolicited
commercial email or an unsolicited sexually explicit email
through the intermediary of an email service provider located
in the state or to an email address held by a resident of the
state may not:
(a) use a third party's Internet domain n a m e in identifying the point of origin or in stating the transmission
path of the email without the third party's consent;
(b) misrepresent any information in identifying the
point of origin or the transmission path of the email; or
(c) fail to include in the email the information necessary to identify the point of origin of the email.
(3) If the recipient of an unsolicited commercial email or an
unsolicited sexually explicit email notifies the sender t h a t the
recipient does not want to receive future commercial email or
future sexually explicit email, respectively, from the sender,
the sender may not send t h a t recipient a commercial email or
a sexually explicit email, as the case may be, either directly or
through a subsidiary or affiliate.
2002
13-36-104. Criminal penalty.
(1) A person who violates any requirement of Section 1336-103 with respect to an unsolicited sexually explicit email is
guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(2) A criminal conviction or a penalty assessed as a result of
a criminal conviction under Subsection (1) does not relieve the
person convicted or assessed from civil liability in an action
under Section 13-36-105.
2002

13-36-105. Civil action for violation — Election on
damages — Costs and attorney fees — Defense.
(1) For any violation of a provision of Section 13-36-103, an
action may be brought by:
(a) a person who received t h e unsolicited commercial
email or unsolicited sexually explicit email with respect to
which the violation under Section 13-36-103 occurred; or
(b) an email service provider through whose facilities
the unsolicited commercial email or unsolicited sexually
explicit email was transmitted.
(2) In each action under Subsection (1):
(a) a recipient or email service provider may:
(i) recover actual damages; or
(ii) elect, in lieu of actual damages, to recover the
lesser of:
(A) $10 per unsolicited commercial email or
unsolicited sexually explicit email received by
the recipient or transmitted through the email
service provider; or
(B) $25,000 per day t h a t the violation occurs;
and
(b) each prevailing recipient or email service provider
shall be awarded costs and reasonable attorney fees.
(3) An email service provider does not violate Section 1336-103 solely by being an intermediary between the sender
and recipient in the transmission of an email t h a t violates
t h a t section.
(4) The violation of Section 13-36-103 by an employee does
not subject the employee's employer to liability under t h a t
section if the employee's violation of Section 13-36-103 is also
a violation of an established policy of the employer t h a t
requires compliance with the requirements of Section 13-36103.

(5) It is a defense to an action brought under this section
that the unsolicited commercial email or unsolicited sexually
explicit email was transmitted accidentally.
2002
CHAPTER 37
NOTICE OF INTENT TO SELL N O N P U B L I C
PERSONAL INFORMATION ACT [EFFECTIVE
JANUARY 1, 2004]
Part 1
General P r o v i s i o n s [Effective J a n u a r y 1, 2004]
Section
13-37-101.

Title [Effective J a n u a r y 1, 2004].

13-37-102.

Definitions [Effective J a n u a r y 1, 2004].
Part 2

N o t i c e of D i s c l o s u r e [Effective J a n u a r y 1, 2004]
13-37-201.
Required notice [Effective J a n u a r y 1, 2004].
13-37-202.
Disclosure of nonpublic personal information
prohibited without notice [Effective J a n u a r y
1, 2004].
13-37-203.
Liability [Effective J a n u a r y 1, 2004].
PARTI
GENERAL PROVISIONS [EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1,
2004]
13-37-101. Title [Effective J a n u a r y 1, 2004].
This chapter is known as the "Notice of Intent to Sell
Nonpublic Personal Information Act."
2003
13-37-102. Definitions [Effective J a n u a r y 1, 2004].
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Affiliate" means a person that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with:
(a) a commercial entity; and
(b) (i) directly; or
(ii) indirectly through one or more intermediaries.
(2) (a) Subject to Subsection (2)(b), "commercial entity" means a person that:
(i) has an office or other place of business
located in the state; and
(ii) in the ordinary course of business transacts a consumer transaction in this state.
(b) "Commercial entity" does not include:
(i) a governmental entity; or
(ii) an entity providing services on behalf of a
governmental entity.
(3) "Compensation" means anything of economic value
t h a t is paid or transferred to a commercial entity for or in
direct consideration of the disclosure of nonpublic personal information.
(4) (a) "Consumer transaction" means:
(i) a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance,
or other written or oral transfer or disposition:
(A) that is initiated or completed in this
state; and
(B) of:
(I) goods;
(II) services; or
(III) other tangible or intangible
property, except securities and insurance or services related thereto; or

ADDENDUM 4

U.S. Code
Q U.S. Code
Q TITLE 47 - TELEGRAPHS. TELEPHONES, AND RADIOTELEGRAPHS
Q CHAPTER 5 - WIRE OR RADIO COMMUNICATION
Q SUBCHAPTER II - COMMON CARRIERS
f*1 Part I — Common Carrier Regulation
[Previous Dpcu^

[Nex|Document.in Book]

47 U.S.C. § 227. R e s t r i c t i o n s on use of t e l e p h o n e equipment
(a)

Definitions

As used in this section —
(1) The term "automatic telephone dialing system" means
equipment which has the capacity —
(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using
a random or sequential number generator; and
(B) to dial such numbers.
(2) The term "telephone facsimile machine" means equipment
which has the capacity (A) to transcribe text or images, or both,
from paper into an electronic signal and to transmit that signal
over a regular telephone line, or (B) to transcribe text or
images (or both) from an electronic signal received over a
regular telephone line onto paper.
(3) The term "telephone solicitation" means the initiation of
a telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the
purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or
services, which is transmitted to any person, but such term does
not include a call or message (A) to any person with that
person's prior express invitation or permission, (B) to any
person with whom the caller has an established business
relationship, or (C) by a tax exempt nonprofit organization.
(4) The term "unsolicited advertisement" means any material
advertising the commercial availability or quality of any
property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person
without that person's prior express invitation or permission.
(b) Restrictions on use of automated telephone equipment
(1) Prohibitions
It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States —
(A) to make any call (other than a call made for emergency
purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called
party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an
artificial or prerecorded voice —
(i) to any emergency telephone line (including any "911"
line and any emergency line of a hospital, medical physician
or service office, health care facility, poison control
center, or fire protection or law enforcement agency);
(ii) to the telephone line of any guest room or patient
room of a hospital, health care facility, elderly home, or
similar establishment; or
(iii) to any telephone number assigned to a paging service,
cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service,
or other radio common carrier service, or any service for
which the called party is charged for the call;

(B) to initiate any telephone call to any residential
telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to
deliver a message without the prior express consent of the
called party, unless the call is initiated for emergency
purposes or is exempted by rule or order by the Commission
under paragraph (2)(B);
(C) to use any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or
other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a
telephone facsimile machine; or
(D) to use an automatic telephone dialing system in such a
way that two or more telephone lines of a multi-line business
are engaged simultaneously.
(2) Regulations; exemptions and other provisions
The Commission shall prescribe regulations to implement the
requirements of this subsection. In implementing the
requirements of this subsection, the Commission —
(A) shall consider prescribing regulations to allow
businesses to avoid receiving calls made using an artificial or
prerecorded voice to which they have not given their prior
express consent;
(B) may, by rule or order, exempt from the requirements of
paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection, subject to such conditions
as the Commission .may prescribe —
(i) calls that are not made for a commercial purpose; and
(ii) such classes or categories of calls made for
commercial purposes as the Commission determines (I) will not adversely affect the privacy rights that
this section is intended to protect; and
(II) do not include the transmission of any unsolicited
advertisement; and
(C) may, by rule or order, exempt from the requirements of
paragraph (1)(A)(iii) of this subsection calls to a telephone
number assigned to a cellular telephone service that are not
charged to the called party, subject to such conditions as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary in the interest of the
privacy rights this section is intended to protect.
(3) Private right of action
A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or
rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that
State (A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the
regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such
violation,
(B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a
violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such
violation, whichever is greater, or
(C) both such actions.
If the court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly
violated this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this
subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount
of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the
amount available under subparagraph (B) of this paragraph.

(1) Rulemaking proceeding required
Within 120 days after December 20, 1991, the Commission shall
initiate a rulemaking proceeding concerning the need to protect
residential telephone subscribers' privacy rights to avoid
receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. The
proceeding shall —
(A) compare and evaluate alternative methods and procedures
(including the use of electronic databases, telephone network
technologies, special directory markings, industry-based or
company-specific "do not call" systems, and any other
alternatives, individually or in combination) for their
effectiveness in protecting such privacy rights, and in terms
of their cost and other advantages and disadvantages;
(B) evaluate the categories of public and private entities
that would have the capacity to establish and administer such
methods and procedures;
(C) consider whether different methods and procedures may
apply for local telephone solicitations, such as local
telephone solicitations of small businesses or holders of
second class mail permits;
(D) consider whether there is a need for additional
Commission authority to further restrict telephone
solicitations, including those calls exempted under subsection
(a)(3) of this section, and, if such a finding is made and
supported by the record, propose specific restrictions to the
Congress; and
(E) develop proposed regulations to implement the methods and
procedures that the Commission determines are most effective
and efficient to accomplish the purposes of this section.
(2) Regulations
Not later than 9 months after December 20, 1991, the Commission
shall conclude the rulemaking proceeding initiated under
paragraph (1) and shall prescribe regulations to implement
methods and procedures for protecting the privacy rights
described in such paragraph in an efficient, effective, and
economic manner and without the imposition of any additional
charge to telephone subscribers.
(3) Use of database permitted
The regulations required by paragraph (2) may require the
establishment and operation of a single national database to
compile a list of telephone numbers of residential subscribers
who object to receiving telephone solicitations, and to make that
compiled list and parts thereof available for purchase. If the
Commission determines to require such a database, such
regulations shall —
(A) specify a method by which the Commission will select an
entity to administer such database;
(B) require each common carrier providing telephone exchange
service, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the
Commission, to inform subscribers for telephone exchange
service of the opportunity to provide notification, in
accordance with regulations established under this paragraph,
that such subscriber objects to receiving telephone
solicitations;
(C) specify the methods by which each telephone subscriber
shall be informed, by the common carrier that provides local

right to give or revoke a notification of an objection under
subparagraph (A), and (ii) the methods by which such right may
be exercised by the subscriber;
(D) specify the methods by which such objections shall be
collected and added to the database;
(E) prohibit any residential subscriber from being charged
for giving or revoking such notification or for being included
in a database compiled under this section;
(F) prohibit any person from making or transmitting a
telephone solicitation to the telephone number of any
subscriber included in such database;
(G) specify (i) the methods by which any person desiring to
make or transmit telephone solicitations will obtain access to
the database, by area code or local exchange prefix, as
required to avoid calling the telephone numbers of subscribers
included in such database; and (ii) the costs to be recovered
from such persons;
(H) specify the methods for recovering, from persons
accessing such database, the costs involved in identifying,
collecting, updating, disseminating, and selling, and other
activities relating to, the operations of the database that are
incurred by the entities carrying out those activities;
(I) specify the frequency with which such database will be
updated and specify the method by which such updating will take
effect for purposes of compliance with the regulations
prescribed under this subsection;
(J) be designed to enable States to use the database
mechanism selected by the Commission for purposes of
administering or enforcing State law;
(K) prohibit the use of such database for any purpose other
than compliance with the requirements of this section and any
such State law and specify methods for protection of the
privacy rights of persons whose numbers are included in such
database; and
(L) require each common carrier providing services to any
person for the purpose of making telephone solicitations to
notify such person of the requirements of this section and the
regulations thereunder.
(4) Considerations required for use of database method
If the Commission determines to require the database mechanism
described in paragraph (3), the Commission shall —
(A) in developing procedures for gaining access to the
database, consider the different needs of telemarketers
conducting business on a national, regional, State, or local
level;
(B) develop a fee schedule or price structure for recouping
the cost of such database that recognizes such differences and (i) reflect the relative costs of providing a national,
regional, State, or local list of phone numbers of
subscribers who object to receiving telephone solicitations;
(ii) reflect the relative costs of providing such lists on
paper or electronic media; and
(iii) not place an unreasonable financial burden on small
businesses; and

(C) consider (i) whether the needs of telemarketers operating
on a local basis could be met through special markings of area
white pages directories, and (ii) if such directories are
needed as an adjunct to database lists prepared by area code
and local exchange prefix.
(5) Private right of action
A person who has received more than one telephone call within
any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in
violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection
may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a
State bring in an appropriate court of that State —
(A) an action based on a violation of the regulations
prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation,
(B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a
violation, or to receive up to $500 in damages for each such
violation, whichever is greater, or
(C) both such actions.
It shall be an affirmative defense in any action brought under
this paragraph that the defendant has established and
implemented, with due care, reasonable practices and procedures
to effectively prevent telephone solicitations in violation of
the regulations prescribed under this subsection. If the court
finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated the
regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in
its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount
equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under
subparagraph (B) of this paragraph.
(6) Relation to subsection (b)
The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed to
permit a communication prohibited by subsection (b) of this
section.
(d) Technical and procedural standards
(1) Prohibition
It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States (A) to initiate any communication using a telephone facsimile
machine, or to make any telephone call using any automatic
telephone dialing system, that does not comply with the
technical and procedural standards prescribed under this
subsection, or to use any telephone facsimile machine or
automatic telephone dialing system in a manner that does not
comply with such standards; or
(B) to use a computer or other electronic device to send any
message via a telephone facsimile machine unless such person
clearly marks, in a margin at the top or bottom of each
transmitted page of the message or on the first page of the
transmission, the date and time it is sent and an
identification of the business, other entity, or individual
sending the message and the telephone number of the sending
machine or of such business, other entity, or individual.
(2) Telephone facsimile machines
The Commission shall revise the regulations setting technical
and procedural standards for telephone facsimile machines to
require that any such machine which is manufactured after one
year after December 20, 1991, clearly marks, in a margin at the
top or bottom of each transmitted page or on the first page of

the business, other entity, or individual sending the message,
and the telephone number of the sending machine or of such
business, other entity, or individual.
(3) Artificial or prerecorded voice systems
The Commission shall prescribe technical and procedural
standards for systems that are used to transmit any artificial or
prerecorded voice message via telephone. Such standards shall
require that —
(A) all artificial or prerecorded telephone messages (i)
shall, at the beginning of the message, state clearly the
identity of the business, individual, or other entity
initiating the call, and (ii) shall, during or after the
message, state clearly the telephone number or address of such
business, other entity, or individual; and
(B) any such system will automatically release the called
party's line within 5 seconds of the time notification is
transmitted to the system that the called party has hung up, to
allow the called party's line to be used to make or receive
other calls.
(e) Effect on State law
(1) State law not preempted
Except for the standards prescribed under subsection (d) of
this section and subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection,
nothing in this section or in the regulations prescribed under
this section shall preempt any State law that imposes more
restrictive intrastate requirements or regulations on, or which
prohibits —
(A) the use of telephone facsimile machines or other
electronic devices to send unsolicited advertisements;
(B) the use of automatic telephone dialing systems;
(C) the use of artificial or prerecorded voice messages; or
(D) the making of telephone solicitations.
(2) State use of databases
If, pursuant to subsection (c)(3) of this section, the
Commission requires the establishment of a single national
database of telephone numbers of subscribers who object to
receiving telephone solicitations, a State or local authority may
not, in its regulation of telephone solicitations, require the
use of any database, list, or listing system that does not
include the part of such single national database that relates to
such State.
(f) Actions by States
(1) Authority of States
Whenever the attorney general of a State, or an official or
agency designated by a State, has reason to believe that any
person has engaged or is engaging in a pattern or practice of
telephone calls or other transmissions to residents of that State
in violation of this section or the regulations prescribed under
this section, the State may bring a civil action on behalf of its
residents to enjoin such calls, an action to recover for actual
monetary loss or receive $500 in damages for each violation, or
both such actions. If the court finds the defendant willfully or
knowingly violated such regulations, the court may, in its
^iorrpfion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal

sentence.
(2) Exclusive jurisdiction of Federal courts
The district courts of the United States, the United States
courts of any territory, and the District Court of the United
States for the District of Columbia shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over all civil actions brought under this
subsection. Upon proper application, such courts shall also have
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, or orders affording like
relief, commanding the defendant to comply with the provisions of
this section or regulations prescribed under this section,
including the requirement that the defendant take such action as
is necessary to remove the danger of such violation. Upon a
proper showing, a permanent or temporary injunction or
restraining order shall be granted without bond.
(3) Rights of Commission
The State shall serve prior written notice of any such civil
action upon the Commission and provide the Commission with a copy
of its complaint, except in any case where such prior notice is
not feasible, in which case the State shall serve such notice
immediately upon instituting such action. The Commission shall
have the right (A) to intervene in the action, (B) upon so
intervening, to be heard on all matters arising therein, and (C)
to file petitions for appeal.
(4) Venue; service of process
Any civil action brought under this subsection in a district
court of the United States may be brought in the district wherein
the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business
or wherein the violation occurred or is occurring, and process in
such cases may be served in any district in which the defendant
is an inhabitant or where the defendant may be found.
(5) Investigatory powers
For purposes of bringing any civil action under this
subsection, nothing in this section shall prevent the attorney
general of a State, or an official or agency designated by a
State, from exercising the powers conferred on the attorney
general or such official by the laws of such State to conduct
investigations or to administer oaths or affirmations or to
compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of
documentary and other evidence.
(6) Effect on State court proceedings
Nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to
prohibit an authorized State official from proceeding in State
court on the basis of an alleged violation of any general civil
or criminal statute of such State.
(7) Limitation
Whenever the Commission has instituted a civil action for
violation of regulations prescribed under this section, no State
may, during the pendency of such action instituted by the
Commission, subsequently institute a civil action against any
defendant named in the Commission's complaint for any violation
as alleged in the Commission's complaint.
(8) "Attorney general" defined
As used in this subsection, the term "attorney general" means
the chief legal officer of a State.
(June 19, 1934, ch. 652, title II, Sec. 227, as added Dec. 20,

1992, Pub.L. 102-556, title IV, Sec. 402, 106 Stat. 4194; Oct. 25,
1994, Pub.L. 103-414, title III, Sec. 303(a) (11), (12), 108 Stat.
4294.)
AMENDMENTS
1994 - Subsec. (b)(2)(C). Pub.L. 103-414, Sec. 303(a)(11),
substituted "paragraph" for "paragraphs".
Subsec. (e)(2). Pub.L. 103-414, Sec. 303(a) (12), substituted
"national database" for "national datebase" after "such
single".
1992 - Subsec. (b)(2)(C). Pub.L. 102-556 added subpar. (C).
EFFECTIVE DATE; DEADLINE FOR REGULATIONS
Section 3(c) of Pub.L. 102-243, as amended by Pub.L. 102-556,
title I, Sec. 102, Oct. 28, 1992, 106 Stat. 4186, provided that:
"(1) Regulations. - The Federal Communications Commission shall
prescribe regulations to implement the amendments made by this
section (enacting this section and amending section 152 of this
title) not later than 9 months after the date of enactment of this
Act (Dec. 20, 1991).
"(2) Effective date. - The requirements of section 227 of the
Communications Act of 1934 (this section) (as added by this
section), other than the authority to prescribe regulations, shall
take effect one year after the date of enactment of this Act (Dec.
20, 1991)."
CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENT OF FINDINGS
Section 2 of Pub.L. 102-243 provided that: "The Congress finds
that:
"(1) The use of the telephone to market goods and services to
the home and other businesses is now pervasive due to the
increased use of cost-effective telemarketing techniques.
"(2) Over 30,000 businesses actively telemarket goods and
services to business and residential customers.
"(3) More than 300,000 solicitors call more than 18,000,000
Americans every day.
"(4) Total United States sales generated through telemarketing
amounted to $435,000,000,000 in 1990, a more than four-fold
increase since 1984.
"(5) Unrestricted telemarketing, however, can be an intrusive
invasion of privacy and, when an emergency or medical assistance
telephone line is seized, a risk to public safety.
"(6) Many consumers are outraged over the proliferation of
intrusive, nuisance calls to their homes from telemarketers.
"(7) Over half the States now have statutes restricting
various uses of the telephone for marketing, but telemarketers
can evade their prohibitions through interstate operations;
therefore, Federal law is needed to control residential
telemarketing practices.
"(8) The Constitution does not prohibit restrictions on
commercial telemarketing solicitations.
"(9) Individuals' privacy rights, public safety interests, and
commercial freedoms of speech and trade must be balanced in a way
that protects the privacy of individuals and permits legitimate

"(10) Evidence compiled by the Congress indicates that
residential telephone subscribers consider automated or
prerecorded telephone calls, regardless of the content or the
initiator of the message, to be a nuisance and an invasion of
privacy.
"(11) Technologies that might allow consumers to avoid
receiving such calls are not universally available, are costly,
are unlikely to be enforced, or place an inordinate burden on the
consumer.
"(12) Banning such automated or prerecorded telephone calls to
the home, except when the receiving party consents to receiving
the call or when such calls are necessary in an emergency
situation affecting the health and safety of the consumer, is the
only effective means of protecting telephone consumers from this
nuisance and privacy invasion.
"(13) While the evidence presented to the Congress indicates
that automated or prerecorded calls are a nuisance and an
invasion of privacy, regardless of the type of call, the Federal
Communications Commission should have the flexibility to design
different rules for those types of automated or prerecorded calls
that it finds are not considered a nuisance or invasion of
privacy, or for noncommercial calls, consistent with the free
speech protections embodied in the First Amendment of the
Constitution.
11
(14) Businesses also have complained to the Congress and the
Federal Communications Commission that automated or prerecorded
telephone calls are a nuisance, are an invasion of privacy, and
interfere with interstate commerce.

"(15) The Federal Communications Commission should consider
adopting reasonable restrictions on automated or prerecorded
calls to businesses as well as to the home, consistent with the
constitutional protections of free speech."
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS
This section is referred to in section 152 of this title.
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1.1200

Delivery restrictions.

i No person may:
Initiate any telephone call (other than a call made for
icy purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called
using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or
)rded voice,
To any emergency telephone line, including any 911 line and any
icy line of a hospital, medical physician or service office,
care facility, poison control center, or fire protection or law
jment agency;
.) To the telephone line of any guest room or patient room of a
L1, health care facility, elderly home, or similar establishment;
i) To any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular
278]]
ne service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio
carrier service, or any service for which the called party is
for the call;
Initiate any telephone call to any residential telephone line
n artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without
or express consent of the called party, unless the call is
ed for emergency purposes or is exempted by Sec. 64.1200(c) of
ction.
Use a telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to
unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine.
Use an automatic telephone dialing system in such a way that two
telephone lines of a multi-line business are engaged
neously.
For the purpose of Sec. 64.1200(a) of this section, the term
zy purposes means calls made necessary in any situation affecting
Lth and safety of consumers.
The term telephone call in Sec. 64.1200(a)(2) of this section
Dt include a call or message by, or on behalf of, a caller:
That is not made for a commercial purpose,
That is made for a commercial purpose but does not include the
ssion of any unsolicited advertisement,
To any person with whom the caller has an established business
iship at the time the call is made, or
Which is a tax-exempt nonprofit organization.
All artificial or prerecorded telephone messages delivered by an
Lc telephone dialing system shall:
At the beginning of the message, state clearly the identity of
.ness, individual, or other entity initiating the call, and
During or after the message, state clearly the telephone number
:han that of the autodialer or prerecorded message player which
:he call) or address of such business, other entity, or
Lai.
No person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation to
>ntial telephone subscriber:
Before the hour of 8 a.m. or after 9 p.m. (local time at the

(2) Unless such person or entity has instituted procedures for
taining a list of persons who do not wish to receive telephone
citations made by or on behalf of that person or entity. The
edures instituted must meet the following minimum standards:
(i) Written policy. Persons or entities making telephone
citations must have a written policy, available upon demand, for
taining a do-not-call list.
(ii) Training of personnel engaged in telephone solicitation,
onnel engaged in any aspect of telephone solicitation must be
rmed and trained in the existence and use of the do-not-call list,
(iii) Recording, disclosure of do-not-call requests. If a person or
ty making a telephone solicitation (or on whose behalf a
citation is made) receives a request from a residential telephone
criber not to receive calls from that person or entity, the person
ntity must record the request and place the subscriber's name and
phone number on the do-not-call list at the time the request is
:. If such requests are recorded or maintained by a party other than
person or entity on whose behalf the solicitation is made, the
on or entity on whose behalf the solicitation is made will be liable
any failures to honor the do-not-call request. In order to protect
consumer's privacy, persons or entities must obtain a consumer's
>r express consent to share or forward the consumer's request not to
:alled to a party other than the person or entity on whose behalf a
.citation is made or an affiliated entity.
(iv) Identification of telephone solicitor. A person or entity
.ng a telephone solicitation must provide the called party with the
> of the individual caller, the name of the person or entity on whose
ilf the call is being made, and a telephone number or address at
:h the person or entity may be contacted. If a person or entity makes
)licitation using an artificial or prerecorded voice message
ismitted by an autodialer, the person or entity must provide a
*phone number other
age 279]]
i that of the autodialer or prerecorded message player which placed
call. The telephone number provided may not be a 900 number or any
ar number for which charges exceed local or long distance
ismission charges.
(v) Affiliated persons or entities. In the absence of a specific
uest by the subscriber to the contrary, a residential subscriber's
riot-call request shall apply to the particular business entity making
call (or on whose behalf a call is made), and will not apply to
iliated entities unless the consumer reasonably would expect them to
included given the identification of the caller and the product being
ertised.
(vi) Maintenance of do-not-call lists. A person or entity making
ephone solicitations must maintain a record of a caller's request not
receive future telephone solicitations. A do not call request must be
ored for 10 years from the time the request is made.
(f) As used in this section:
(1) The terms automatic telephone dialing system and autodialer mean
.ipment which has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers
be called using a random or sequential number generator and to dial
:h numbers.
(2) The term telephone facsimile machine means equipment which has
; capacity to transcribe text or images, or both, from paper into an
sctronic signal and to transmit that signal over a regular telephone
le, or to transcribe text or images (or both) from an electronic
jnal received over a regular telephone line onto paper.
(3) The term telephone solicitation means the initiation of a
Lephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or
ital of, or investment in, property, goods, or services, which is
ansmitted to any person, but such term does not include a call or
ssage:
(i) To any person with that person's prior express invitation or
rmission;
(ii) To any person with whom the caller has an established business
lationship; or
(Hi)
Bv or on behalf of a tax-exempt nonprofit organization.

ng reiationsnip tormed by a voluntary two-way communication
m a person or entity and a residential subscriber with or without
hange of consideration, on the basis of an inquiry, application,
se or transaction by the residential subscriber regarding products
vices offered by such person or entity, which relationship has not
reviously terminated by either party.
) The term unsolicited advertisement means any material
ising the commercial availability or quality of any property,
or services which is transmitted to any person without that
's prior express invitation or permission.
48335, Oct. 23, 1992; 57 FR 53293, Nov. 9, 1992, as amended at 60
69, Aug. 15, 1995]

